Hyungsub Choi (Chemical Heritage Foundation)

From a war-torn country at the end of World War II, Japan rapidly emerged as one of the leading manufacturer of transistors in the world by 1960. Many “Western” scholars have puzzled over the phenomenal growth of the postwar Japanese economy in general, and its electronics industry in particular. Most have emphasized two factors: (1) the massive importation of technology from the United States; and (2) the strong leadership role of the Japanese government, spearheaded by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). On the other hand, in Japan, there is a fairly large body journalistic literature that emphasizes the role of heroic scientists and engineers. Mostly produced after the 1980s, this narrative provides detailed micro-histories of individuals who participated in the build-up of the Japanese electronics industry.

In this paper, I will take two distinctive approaches to gain a better understanding of the early history of semiconductor manufacturing in Japan: the “meso-level” and the transnational.

First, this paper maintains that only from the “meso-level” (following Thomas J. Misa) can we begin to understand the diverse approaches of technology importation taken by different Japanese firms. I aim to sketch a middle path between the macro-analyses of Western scholars and the micro-histories of Japanese journalists. The focus on individual firms allows us to disaggregate the monolithic notions of the “Japanese” and “American” technologies and industries, which will lead to a better understanding of the range of options that individual firms faced at each historical juncture.

Second, this paper takes a transnational perspective. Rather than depicting U.S. electronics manufacturers as sources of new technology, this paper will attend to the dynamic interplay of diversified actors on both sides of the Pacific. The difference in technical choice and patent-licensing policy between RCA and Western Electric (WE) mattered to the story as much as disparities between Hitachi and Sony. RCA CEO David Sarnoff’s perception of Japan as a technology follower had real consequences, as much as Kōbe Kōgyō President Takao Shigezō’s acute awareness of U.S. technological leadership in the postwar period. Taking this viewpoint allows us to capture the interactive complexities in the circulation of manufacturing knowledge.

From these two vantage points, this paper will explain two puzzles. First, what accounts for the Japanese firms’ diverse approaches in technology importation? For example, Kōbe Kōgyō and Hitachi approached RCA in 1952 and WE in 1954. In contrast, Sony approached WE in 1953 and RCA in 1958. How can we understand the differences? Second, how can we understand the quirky behavior of MITI? Despite the popular conception of MITI as all-seeing eye, the ministry initially declined Sony’s request for the disbursement of foreign capital to purchase WE’s transistor patent license in 1953. How can we put MITI’s behavior in its proper context?

Using primary documentations from David Sarnoff Library, AT&T Archives, and the Japan National Diet Library, as well as published sources such as Japanese company periodicals, technical journals, and popular magazines, this paper will illuminate the process of knowledge circulation in the postwar world.